George C. Marshall, the Army's Chief of Staff during 1939-45 and Secretary of State and Defense during 1947-49 and 1950-51, respectively, is best known as the Allies' "organizer of victory" during World War II and steward of the namesake economic recovery program that helped stave off communist-incited instability in postwar Western Europe. Far less well-known is Marshall's extensive engagement with the world of intelligence during those years. In his Army leadership role in World War II, his diplomatic mission to China right after the war, and his service as head of the State and Defense Departments, he grappled with difficult issues concerning intelligence capabilities and authorities, security concerns, and political and bureaucratic conflicts that persist today in the US Intelligence Community. How he approached them can provide insights for current intelligence leaders and practitioners as they confront those historically enduring problems.
Description:
George C. Marshall, the Army's Chief of Staff during 1939-45 and Secretary of State and Defense during 1947-49 and 1950-51, respectively, is best known as the Allies' "organizer of victory" during World War II and steward of the namesake economic recovery program that helped stave off communist-incited instability in postwar Western Europe. Far less well-known is Marshall's extensive engagement with the world of intelligence during those years. In his Army leadership role in World War II, his diplomatic mission to China right after the war, and his service as head of the State and Defense Departments, he grappled with difficult issues concerning intelligence capabilities and authorities, security concerns, and political and bureaucratic conflicts that persist today in the US Intelligence Community. How he approached them can provide insights for current intelligence leaders and practitioners as they confront those historically enduring problems.